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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYNN B. CALAHAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, t Civil No. 
V. 
~ KAY LAUREL WOOD, 11552 Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for damages for injuries sustained by 
the plaintiff, Marilynn B. Calahan, when the car in which she 
was a guest passenger, was struck in the rear by a truck driv-
en by the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff in her cause of action alleged that defendant 
was negligent in driving the truck into the stopped vehicles 
(R.3). Defendant alleged that plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent in remaining in the car, had assumed the risk of 
injury and denied his own negligence (R.5). Although the 
plaintiff objected, the jury was allowed to decide on the is-
sues of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, and 
were instructed also on unavoidable accident (R. 23 Instruc-
tion numbers 14 and 20, Interrogatory No. 2). The jury found 
that defendant had operated his truck in a negligent manner, 
but also found that plaintiff's remaining in the car while it 
was stopped constituted contributory negligence. Plaintiff's 
contributory negligence and defendant's negligence were 
found on special interrogatories submitted to the jury. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant urges the court to rule that other submission 
to the jury of the issues of unavoidable accident, assumption 
of risk and contributory negligence were prejudicial error, 
and that as a matter of law there was insufficient evidence 
of negligence on the part of plaintiff to submit the issue to 
the jury; that the verdict of the jury as to the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff be overruled, and a new trial grant-
ed to determine the amount of damages sustained by the plain-
tiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arose out of an automobile accident which oc-
curred in the early morning hours of December 19, 1966 (Tr. 
6, 8, 17, 20, 28). Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile 
driven by Ron Holbrook. (Tr. 18, 53). The Holbrook car had 
trouble starting, (Tr. 6, 18, 21, 42), so a friend of Mr. Hol-
brooks, Richard Cornia, agreed to use his car in pushing the 
stalled car in an attempt to get it started (Tr. 6, 18, 21, 42). 
The Cornia vehicle alternately pushed and followed the Hol· 
brook vehicle down the road on State Road 39 for about one 
mile from Chris', where they had embarked (Tr. 6, 12, 18, 28). 
When the Holbrook car did not start after traveling about 
one mile, both cars pulled to the side of the road and stopped 
(Tr. 7, 18). The drivers of the vehicles felt they had pulled 
off the road as far as possible (Tr. 43, 55, 65). There was 
patchy fog on the road, (Tr. 13, 18, 29, 47, 65), but Mr. Cor-
nia testified visibility was about one block (Tr. 4 7). The cars 
left their lights on after stopping (Tr. 7, 11, 18, 21, 24, 25, 42, 
55, 65). Within minutes after stopping, the Cornia vehicle 
was struck in the rear by a truck driven by defendant (Tr. 8, 
14, 27, 85). The force of impact was sufficient to cause extens-
ive damage to the Cornia vehicle, drive the Cornia vehicle 
into the Holbrook vehicle, and cause extensive damage to the 
2 
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Holbrook vehicle (Tr. 8, 20, 31, 43, 44). The damage was so 
extensive that both cars were determined to be total losses 
by the insurance company (Tr. 8, 20, 43, 44). 
Defendant claimed he did not see any lights from the 
vehicles prior to the impact (Tr. 85), and therefore did not 
apply his brakes. The evidence is uncontradicted by Mr. Wood 
that the truck struck the cars before he applied his brakes 
(Tr. 27, 30, 86). Mr. Wood also failed to see Mr. Cornia giving 
signals to go around the cars (Tr. 44). 
At the time of the collision, plaintiff was sitting in the 
front seat of the Holbrook vehicle waiting for the men to get 
it started (Tr. 55). She had remained in the vehicle because 
of the extremely cold weather and snow outside, and her de-
sire to remain as warm as possible (Tr. 66). Plaintiff has in-
juries to her neck and back, which resulted from the collision 
(Tr. 66), and has suffered severe pain, lost work and has been 
unable to continue her schooling (Tr. 56, 57, 75, 76, 77). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY, 
OVER THE OBJECTION OF PLAINTIFF, ON THE DOCTRINE 
OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK. 
In its instruction number 14 to the jury, the court in-
structed on the Doctrine of assumption of risk. 
It is a well recognized legal principle that the doctrine 
of assumption of risk differs from contributory negligence. 
The main difference is that assumption of risk requires a per-
son to have knowledge of the danger, appreciate the danger, 
and then deliberately expose himself to the danger. _Strand 
Enterprises v. Turner, 233 Miss. 588, 78 So 2d 769 (1955); 
Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 42 Cal. 2d 158, 265 P 2d 904 
(1954); Talizan v. Oak Creek Riding Club, 176 Cal. App. 2d 
3 
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429, 1 Cal Rptr 514 (1959); Klepp v. Prawl, 181 Kan. 590, 
313 p 2d 227, (1957). 
In the Strand case supra, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
stated: 
"In order for one to be barred of recovery under the 
doctrine of assumption of risk, he must know and ap-
preciate the danger and deliberately expose himself 
thereto." 78 So 2d at 773 
In the Klepp .case supra, the Kansas Supreme Court speak-
ing of assumption of risk stated: 
" . . . it implies intentional exposure to a known dan-
ger, it embraces a mental state of willingness . . ." 
313 P 2d at 230 
The court has often recognized the distinction between 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk. In Ferguson 
v. Jongsma,. 10 Utah 2d 179, 350 P 2d. 404 (1960) this court 
stated: 
"Contributory negligence is based on carelessness, in-
advertence, and unintended events, but assumption of 
risk requires an intelligent and deliberate choice to 
assume a known risk." 
10 Utah 2d at 190 
This court further stated in the Ferguson case: 
"Assumption of risk requires knowledge by plaintiff 
of a specific defect or dangerous condition caused by 
defendant's negligence or lack of due care which plain-
tiff could have, but voluntarily and deliberately failed 
to avoid and thereby assumed the risk of the injuries 
he sustained." 
Supra at 190. 
In other words, to assume the risk of injury from a per-
son's negligence, plaintiff must know of the negligent act, 
realize the danger it creates and then voluntarily submit to 
the danger. These requirements of knowledge and consent are 
4 
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applied in the case of Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 
p 2d 404 (1959); and Hindmarsch v. 0. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 
21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P 2 d 410 (1968); 
In the Hindmarsch case this court stated: 
"The doctrine of assumption of risk is but a specialized 
aspect of the defense of contributory negligence. This 
court has repeatedly declared the law in that respect: 
That it applied only where the plaintiff knew of and 
appreciated the danger, and had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to make alternative choice, but nevertheless 
voluntarily exposed himself to the danger in question." 
21 Utah 2d at 416. 
Therefore, before palintiff can be said to have assumed 
the risk, she must have known of a dangerous condition cre-
ated by a person's negligence, she must appreciate the danger 
such negligent act has caused, and then she must willingly 
and knowing submit herself to the possibility of harm caus-
ed by the negligent act. 
In Fisher v. U. S. Steel Corp., 334 F2d 904 (5th Cir., 
1964), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that before 
assumption of risk would apply, plaintiff must have actual 
knowledge of the hazard and not be merely in a position where 
by ordinary care the hazard should be apparent. This require-
ment of actual subjective knowledge and not merely an oppor-
tunity to obtain it has been accepted as absolutely necessary 
before assumption of risk will apply in most other jurisdic-
tions, and seems to be the better rule. The courts have recog-
nized that where the plaintiff could have realized the pres-
ence of danger, but did not, the proper defense is contribu-
tory negligence, since assumption of risk requires actual sub-
jective knowledge. Johnson v. Maynard, supra; Clay v. Dun-
ford, 121Utah177, 239 P2d 1075 (1952);.Sullivan v. Shell Oil 
So., 234 F2d 733 (9th Cir., 1956) Cert. denied 352 U.S. 925, 
5 
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77 S. Ct. 221, 1 L. ld. 2d 160;, Benwell v. Dean, 38 Cal Rptr. 
542 (Dist. Ct. 1964);, Cooper v. Lunsford,_ 44 Cal Rptr. 530 
(Dist. Ct. 1965);_Rogers v. L.A. Transit Lines, 45 Cal. 2d 414, 
289 P 2d 226 (1955); Hacker v. Burkner ,_ 263 Minn. 278, 117 
NW 2d, 13 (1962); Restatement of Torts 2d Sec. 496D. 
Defendant urges that plaintiff assumed the risk of in-
jury by remaining in the car in a dangerous position. As a 
matter of law, a person has a right to assume that others will 
comply with the law and operate their vehicle in a careful 
manner and comply with the rule of the road. Lazar v. Black 
& White Cab Co., 50 Ga. App. 567, 179 S.E. 250 (1935); Rog-
ers v. Jefferson, 224 Iowa 324, 275 N.W. 874 (1937); Jacob-
son v. Asahay, 188 Minn. 179, 246 N.W. 670 (1933); a plaintiff 
is not required to anticipate a danger which can only arise 
due to the subsequent negligence of another person. Woodall 
v. Wayne Steffner Productions, 201 Cal. App. 2d 800, 20 Cal. 
Rptr. 572 (1962); Bullock v. Benjamin Moore & Co. 392 S.W. 
2d 10 (Mo. 1965); Peoples Drug Stores v. Windham, 178 Md. 
172, 12 A2d 532 (1940); Mainford v. Giannestras, 111 N.E. 
2d 692 (Ohio 1951); 
In the Mainfort case the Ohio Court stated: 
"It is true that the doctrine of assumption of risk ap-
plies only with respect to the hazard of a situation al-
ready existing. If one has full knowledge of an open 
and visible condition, appreciates the dangers incident 
thereto, and voluntarily acts with reference thereto, 
he assumes the risks of the attendant dangers. It is a 
matter of full knowledge and intelligent acquiescence. 
But a person cannot voluntarily act with reference to 
a condition or situation created by the negligence of 
another unless that negligence has previously occur-
red; he cannot assume the risks of a condition created 
6 
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by subsequent negligence." 
111 N.E. 2d at 692. 
The idea that a person cannot assume the risk of a third 
person's subsequent negligence is further supported in the 
Bullock case, supra, wherein the Missouri Court stated: 
" ... one's knowledge of a general condition from which 
the danger arose does not necessarily constitute knowl-
edge and appreciation of the danger of injury ( cita-
tions omitted) ... the mere knowledge of the fact that 
an injury might result ... is not sufficient." 
392 S.W. 2d at 14. 
In the instant case plaintiff was a passenger in a car stall-
ed on the highway. It was the middle of the night and sub-
zero weather. Defendant claims that plaintiff assumed the 
risk of injury by remaining in the stalled car. Plaintiff testi-
fied she was not aware of any specific danger to her from re-
maining in the car (Tr. 66, 67, 68). She testified she was tired 
and her main concern was keeping warm (Tr. 66, 67). The 
jury found defendant was negligent in colliding with the stall-
ed cars. Therefore, to have assumed the risk of injury from 
the collision, plaintiff would have had to assume defendant 
would drive negligently, collide with the stopped car, and that 
such collision would injure her. These assumptions are clear-
ly not required by law. Bullock v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 
supra, and cases cited supra, Pages 5 & 6. 
As this court stated in Clay v. Dunford, supra: 
"Plaintiff must have looked, must have seen, and must 
have known of the danger voluntarily subjecting him-
self thereto and consenting that if injury result he 
who may have negligently exposed him thereto should 
be relieved of any liability therefore." 
232 P2d at 1076. 
There is no evidence which would show that plaintiff in 
the instant case looked, saw and realized the danger of colli-
7 
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sion by a negligently operated vehicle, or that she in any man-
ner actually realized that she was in danger of injury. She 
certainly did not consider relieving a third party from liabil-
ity for injuries she might subsequently receive due to the third 
party's negligence. Defendant claims plaintiff should have 
realized the danger since it was obvious, but failure to dis-
cover a danger is not a proper part of the defense of assump-
tion of risk as this court stated in Clay v. Dunford, supra: 
"Failure to exercise ordinary care to discover the dan-
ger is not properly a matter of assumption of risk, but 
of the defense of contributory negligence." 
239 P2d at 1077. 
In the Clay case, this court held it to be error to instruct 
the jury on assumption of risk when there was no evidence 
of actual subjective knowledge on the part of plaintiff, and 
a subsequent acquiescence to the possibility of injury. This 
court has consistently found it reversable error to wrongfully 
instruct a jury on assumption of risk, as when there is no 
evidence of the required elements. Clay v. Dunford, supra; 
, . 
Johnson v. Maynard, supra; Ferguson v. Jongsma, supra;_Hind-
marsch v. 0. P. Skaggs Foodilner, supra. 
It is submitted that the doctrine of assumption of risk 
is not applicable to this case since no evidence appears in the 
record on which the court could justify an instruction embo-
dying its doctrine. There is no evidence of subjective knowl-
edge, of appreciation of the danger or of consent. Thus the 
court erred in instructing the jury on assumption of risk in 
the absence of any evidence on which the jury could deter-
mine that Mrs. Calahan had in fact assumed the risk of in-
jury. The only purpose the instruction could have was to con-
fuse the jury and prejudice plaintiff's right to a fair and im-
partial determination of her rights. 
8 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON 
"UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENT" OVER THE OBJECTION OF 
PLAINTIFF. 
a. There was no evidence presented in the case upon 
which a jury could base a verdict of unavoidable ac-
cident. 
It is undisputed evidence that the collision took place 
about one mile west of Chris' on State Road 39, and involved 
the Wood vehicle and two other cars which were stopped on 
the road and partially blocking the westbound travel lane (Tr. 
16, 18, 20, 22, 28, 34), and that the weather was extremely 
cold and there was patchy fog (Tr. 13, 18, 29, 47, 65, 85). 
Based on the evidence the trial court instructed the jury 
as follows, over the objection of plaintiff: 
"No. 20. The law recognizes unavoidable accidents. An 
unavoidable accident is one which occurs in such a 
manner that it cannot justly be said to have been proxi-
mately caused by negligence as those terms are here-
in defined. In the event a party is damaged by an un-
avoidable accident, he has no right to recover, since 
the law requires that a person be injured by the fault 
or negligence of another as a prerequisite to any right 
to recover damages." 
The cases are uniform to the effect that it is error to 
instruct on the doctrine of unavoidable accidents in the ab-
sence of affirmative evidence to show that the accident was 
in fact unavoidable. The instruction may not be given where 
the evidence leaves it to conjecture or surmise. In an ordi-
nary case where, as here, plaintiff charges negligence and the 
defendant enters a general denial and charges contributory 
negligence, an instruction on unavoidable accidents is not 
proper. The cases and test writers are uniform in this holding. 
Huffman v. City of Hot Springs, 237 Ar. 757, 375 S.W. 2d, 795 
9 
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(1964); Rabe v. Lee, 239 S.W. 2d, 254 (Okla. 1954); ,Williams 
v. Burrell, 43 Ohio App. 341, 182 N.E. 889 (1953); Johnson v. 
Macias 193 F. 2d 475 (5th Cir., 1952). 
In the Williams case, supra, the Ohio court stated: 
"The court may charge upon the subject of unavoid-
able accident only when this matter is raised by the 
pleadings, or when the defense and the evidence in the 
trial clearly tend to show or infer that the accident 
was one which was clearly unavoidable ... where the 
evidence in the case clearly shows negligence, there 
is no place in the court's charge for a charge of un-
avoidable accident and the case is solely one as to who 
was negligent." 
182 N.E. at 890. 
Thus where there is evidence that someone was negli-
gent and the question is "who was negligent?", the court is 
in error to instruct on unavoidable accident. This is the idea 
expressed by the Texas Court in Rabe v. Lee, supra, wherein 
the court stated: 
'Under the circumstances ... either one or both of 
the drivers of the two cars would be guilty of negligence 
. . . all of the evidence tended to show one or the other 
driver guilty of negligence. There was no evidence that 
the act of a third person or something other than the 
negligence of the driver of the two cars caused the 
collision. Under such circumstances the question of 
unavoidable accident was not in the case." 
239 s.w. 2d. 
There is no evidence in the present case that would show 
that anything other than negligence of one of the parties was 
responsible for the collision. When such is the case, it has 
been held that giving of an instruction on unavoidable acci· 
dent is reversable error. Grey v. Woods, 84 Ariz. 87, 324 P2d 
220 (1958). Plaintiff urges therefore that giving an instruc· 
tion on unavoidable accident in the present case was not based 
10 
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on any evidence in the case and was therefore error. 
b. No issue of unavoidable accident was raised by the 
pleadings or otherwise. 
There is a split of authority on the question of whether 
or not the defense of unavoidable accident must be specifically 
pleaded, even though there might be evidence on which such 
a charge might be based. We believe the weight of authority 
as well as the better rule is to the effect that it must be spe-
cifically pleaded. 
Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile and Practice, Vol-
ume lOC Section 6698 states: 
"A party is not entitled to an instruction on the theory 
of unavoidable accident in the absence of anv evidence 
on which to base it, or upon pleadings not raising the 
the issue such as where both parties charge negligence 
in their pleadings." 
Frazier v. Stellinger, 52 Cal. App. 2d, 564, 126 P. 2d 653 
( 1942); Harper v. Hall, 76 Ga. App. 441, 46 S.E. 2d 201 
(1948); Ault v. Whittemore,. 73 Ga. App. 10, 35 S.E. 2d 
526 (1945); Aura v. Karschner, 32 Ohio 492, 168 N.E. 237 
(1929); Southland Greyhound Lines v. Dennison, 62 S.W. 
2d 500 (Civ. App. 1933). 
In the present case, the pleadings did not raise the issue 
of unavoidable accident. Plaintiff alleged she was injured due 
to the negligence of defendant. Defendant denied negligence 
and alleged plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The issue 
of unavoidable accident was not mentioned during trial and no 
evidence was presented on it. The issue did not enter the trial 
until the jury was instructed. Plaintiff therefore urges that it 
was prejudicial error to instruct the jury on unavoidable acci-
dent since it was not an issue at trial, and its submission could 
only serve the purpose of confusing the jury and prejudicing 
plaintiff's rights. 
11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING, OVER THE OB-
JECTION OF THE PLAINTIFF, THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY. 
Interrogatory number two presented the issue of plaint-
iff's contributory negligence to the jury. 
The cases are uniform to the effect that it is error to 
instruct the jury on the issue of contributory negligence when 
there is no evidence to justify finding the plaintiff contribu-
torily negligent. Brakah v. Holdebrand, 134 Col. 197, 301 
P.2d 347 (1956); Dean v. Martz 329 S.W. 2nd 371, (Ky. 1959); 
. ' 
City of Phoenix v. Brown, 88 Ariz. 60, 352 P2d 754 (1960); 
Vallier v. Fosburg, 365 P.2d 1960 (Okla. 1961); Davis v. Laird, 
108 Ga. App. 729, 134 S.E. 2d 467 (1963); Smith v. Bishop, 
32 Ill. 2d 380, 205 N.E. 2d 461 (1965). 
Defendant charged that it was a breach of duty for plaint-
iff to remain in the stopped car. Plaintiff admitted remaining 
in the car, but denied that such conduct was contributory neg-
ligence. Plaintiff was not imputed with any negligence of the 
driver of the car since the general rule is that a guest passen-
ger is not imputed with the negligence of the driver of a ve-
hicle. Evans vs. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 255 F.2d 205 (3rd Cir., 
1958); Bailey v. Brannin, 279 F.2d 344 (3rd Cir., 1960); Hud-
son v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 120 Utah 245, 233 P.2d 357 
(1951); Therefore, any negligence of plaintiff would have to 
be based upon her remaining in the stalled car. 
Plaintiff claims that she was within her rights and acting 
prudently by remaining in the car. In her testimony, plaintiff 
admitted that there is a general danger any time a car is stop-
ped in the road (Tr. 66). Plaintiff, however, further testified 
that due to the extreme temperatures outside, the fact that 
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the weather was bad, and that the only alternative to sitting 
in the car, was standing in the road, she felt safe in the car 
(Tr. 66, 67, 68). There were cars passing on the left of the 
vehicle (Tr. 7, 19, 25, 42, 55, 65). It was therefore reasonable 
for plaintiff to assume subsequent traffic would also pass 
on the left. Plaintiff testified she was not worried about an 
accident. This is reasonable since the cars had their lights on 
(Tr. 7, 11, 18, 21, 24, 42, 55). Plaintiff had no reason to as-
sume that the defendant in coming down the road would fail 
to see the lights of the stalled cars and would collide with 
them rather than passing on the left as other cars had done. 
The only way plaintiff's position could become dangerous was 
by the subsequent negligence of a driver approaching the stall-
ed vehicles. 
In Moreno v. Los Angeles Transfer Co., 44 Cal. App. 551, 
186 P. 800 (1920) the California court stated: 
"The plaintiff Moreno was not required either under 
the common law or any statutory enactment of this 
state to refrain lrom occupying a position that could 
only become a place of danger by reason of the negli-
gence of another . . . contributory negligence cannot 
be predicated upon an omission to assume that another 
will violate the law." 
186 P. at 802. 
The idea that one cannot be guilty of contributory negli-
gence for failing to assume another might violate the law or 
fail in their duty is followed by the Alabama court in Pollard 
v. Stewart, 27 Ala. 116, 158 So. 203 ( 1936). In the Pollard 
case, a motorist stalled his car on a railroad crossing. He didn't 
see a train coming so he remained in the car and tried to start 
it. He was injured when a train struck the car. Defendant 
argued that it was contributory negligence for plaintiff to re-
main in the car when he should have realized that being stall-
ed on a railroad track was dangerous. The law required a train 
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on approaching a crossing to slow down and sound a whistle 
as a safety warning. The defendant's train which struck plain-
tiff failed to do so. The question arose whether it was con-
tributory negligence to fail to keep a lookout for coming trains 
and to remove himself from the car. The court held that plain-
tiff was not contributorily negligent for staying in the car and 
stated: 
"It was the right of the plaintiff to continue to try to 
start his car until warned of the danger to his life and 
limb ... he had a right to assume ... defendant would 
act with due care and would observe the mandates of 
the law . . . there was no duty resting on plaintiff to 
anticipate the capability of defendants servants ... he 
had a right to rely upon an observance of the law by de-
fendants servants." 
168 So. at 204. 
Such a right to rely on observance of the law by others 
is well recognized. Foreman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 
228 Ky. 332, 145 S.W. 2d 1079 (1929); Goldstein v. Priver, 
64 Cal. App. 249, 221 P. 393 (1923); Ford v. Tremont Lumber 
Co., 123 La. 742, 49 So. 492 (1909); Stout v. Lewis, 11 La. App. 
503, 123 So. 346 (1929); Hasie v. Alabama and V. Ry. Co., 
78 Miss. 413, 28 So. 941 (1900); McCulloch v. Horton, 102 Mont. 
135, 56 P.2d 1344 (1937). 
In Vallier v. Fosbury, supra, the court held that a pas· 
senger was not contributorily negligent for failing to antici· 
pate danger. The court stated: 
"Our examination of the record reveals no evidence 
from which it may be inferred or presumed that plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent. She had no warning 
of approaching danger ... " 
365 P.2d at 162. 
In the instant case, the jury was allowed to find plain· 
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tiff contributorily negligent for remaining in the car when, 
to quote defendant, "to do so exposed her to an unreasonable 
risk of injury to herself." Interrogatory No. 2. Remaining in 
the car was not in itself dangerous, and plaintiff's position 
would only be dangerous subsequent to defendant's negligence. 
As in the Pollard case, supra. Plaintiff had no reason to as-
sume defendant would operate his truck negligently, she had 
no reason to anticipate injury from Wood's negligence and 
hence could not be guilty of contributory negligence for re-
maining seated in the car when being so seated was dangerous 
only if some third person negligently collided with the stalled 
car. 
The courts are uniform in refusing to find a person guilty 
of contributory negligence by a plaintiff when plaintiff's only 
act has been to remain seated in a stalled or parked car. 
Pollard v. Stewart, supra; Remmenya v. Selk, 150 Neb. 401, 
34 N. W. 2d 757 (1948); Allen v. Clark, 148 Neb. 627, 28 N.W. 
2d 439 (1947); Fingeret v. Mann, 319 Pa. 262, 175 A 674 
(1935); Vallier v. Fosburg, supra. 
The Remmenya case, supra, is very similar to the instant 
case. The trial court allowed the jury to decide the issue of 
whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent for remaining 
in the car stopped on the highway. In granting a new trial 
for the error of submitting contributory negligence to the 
jury, the court stated: 
"Was the plaintiff's conduct in remaining in the car 
for a minute or thereabouts after it was parked and 
just prior to the accident such that under the circum-
stances here disclosed it would justify a jury in finding 
that she was guilty of contributory negligence? ... we 
think not." 
34 N.W. 26 at 764. 
In Allen v. Clark, supra, the Nebraska court rules that 
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remaining in a car stalled in a traffic lane is not sufficient 
evidence to present the question of contributory negligence 
to the jury. The defendant had charged, as in the present case, 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence because 
he remained in the stalled car in a traffic lane when he should 
have known that it was dangerous and alighted from the car. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that in the above circum· 
stances there was not enough evidence to present the issue 
of contributory negligence to the jury. The Court stated: 
"This court finds that there was no evidence showing 
any negligence on the part of the plaintiff. This court 
has repeatedly said that where contributory negligence 
is pleaded as a defense, but there is no evidence to sup-
port such a defense, it is prejudicial error to submit 
such issue to the jury." 
28 N.W. 2d at 444. 
Therefore, a mere showing that plaintiff remained in a 
car which was stopped or stalled in a traveled traffic lane and 
the allegation of defendant that to so remain is dangerous, is 
not sufficient evidence to allow the issue of contributory neg-
ligence to go to the jury. 
In Fingeret v. Mann, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had 
. . 
this mae problem before it. 
The court stated: 
"We are convinced, however, that the trial judge was 
in error in instructing the jury that they might proper· 
ly find Mrs. Fingeret guilty of contributory negligence. 
She was a guest in the car, and it is well settled that 
the negligence of the driver is not to be imputed to a 
guest . . . There is no evidence in the case from whieh 
any breach of duty on her part could be inferred." 
178 A. at 675. 
Mrs. Fingeret had been a passenger in a car which was 
struck while stopped on the highway. 
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The factual situation in the Andrews v. Stark, 193 Wash. 
204, 74 P2d 999 (1938), is nearly identical to the facts involv-
ed in the present case. However, the driver of the stalled car 
and the pushing car were involved rather than a passenger. 
The court in that case upheld the trial court in its conclusion 
that there was no negligence on the part of the mentioned 
drivers, but that the proximate cause of the accident was the 
reckless and careless driving of the driver who had failed to 
observe or stop for the stalled vehicles. 
Therefore, under the cases discussed above, plaintiff had 
no duty to assume that the defendant would drive negligent-
ly. Defendant failed to show that any conduct of plaintiff in 
any manner breached a duty owed to the public, generally or 
to defendant specifically. The record fails to show evidence 
on which a charge of contributory negligence could be based. 
We respectfully urge the court that it is error to charge the 
jury on contributory negligence, merely because defendant 
alleged it in his pleadings. Based upon the cases cited the fac-
tual situation involved, and the record, there is insufficient 
evidence that plaintiff breached any duty at all. The plaintiff 
submits that it was prejudicial error for the court to submit 
the question of contributory negligence to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the court's instructions given to the 
jury on assumption of risk, unavoidable accident and contri-
butory negligence constituted an error which was prejudicial 
to the rights of the plaintiff. This submission is based upon 
the laws as set forth as related to a guest passenger and the 
factual situation presented. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CARL T. SMITH, 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
520 - 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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